2020

# Washington State Interagency Feral Swine Response Plan

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE STRAETIGIES

Manage the Damage
Stop Feral Swine

Washington Department of FISH and WILDLIFE

WASHINGTON STATE RECREATION AND CONSERVATION OFFICE
Washington Invasive Species Council

WSDA

USDA

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# Signature Page

We, the undersigned response agency decision-makers, recognize that response to feral swine is essential to protecting the agriculture, wildlife, environment, and economy of Washington State and that the best way to provide that response is through implementation of this plan.

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Eric Gardner, Wildlife Program Director
Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife

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Steve Bear, Chief of Enforcement
Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife

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Brian Joseph, State Veterinarian
Washington State Department of Agriculture

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Mike Linnell, State Director
USDA Wildlife Services

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Raymond Willard, Chair
Washington Invasive Species Council

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# Overview

The Washington State Invasive Species Council (WISC), Washington State Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW), and Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service, Wildlife Services (USDA-WS) has developed plans and response strategies to reduce the environmental and economic harm caused by feral swine in Washington State. This plan is intended to be a living document that is reviewed, improved, and updated annually or upon request.

Feral swine (*Sus scrofa*) are an invasive species and pose serious ecological, economic, and health threats. They are aggressive animals that can be extremely destructive to fields, fences, and facilities. Their wallows can affect ponds and wetlands, muddying the water and destroying aquatic vegetation. They can strip a field of crops in one night, and pose a threat to ground-nesting birds and some endangered species. Feral swine also can transmit diseases and parasites, such as pseudorabies, brucellosis, and tuberculosis, to livestock and people.

Under WAC 16.54.010, feral swine are defined as:

- Animals of the genus *Sus* that are free roaming on public or private lands and do not appear to be domesticated;
- Swine that have been released or born into the wild state;
- European wild hogs and their hybrid forms (also known as European wild boars or razorbacks), regardless of whether they are free roaming or kept in confinement; or
- Animals of the family *Tayassuidae* such as peccaries and javelinas, regardless of whether they are free roaming or kept in confinement.

In accordance with, WAC 16.54.111 and WAC 16.54.065, feral swine are prohibited in Washington. If found, feral swine will be eradicated and disposed of in a humane manner under the authority of WAC 16.80.060.

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# Chapter 1: Coordination and Groups

In Washington State, RCW 38.52 mandates the use of the standardized Incident Command System (ICS) in all multi-agency (federal, state, and local) or multi-jurisdictional incidents and emergencies. WISC, in participation with local, state, and federal agencies, will use the standardized ICS system for an expanding feral swine response event.

## Multi-Agency Coordination Group

With a positive detection of feral swine in the state of Washington, Washington Invasive Species Council Executive Coordinator will establish a Multi-Agency Coordination Group (MAC-G) to allow input from other local, state, and federal agencies that have the legal responsibility for the protection of animal and human health. This group will coordinate with the Incident Management Teams, if any are used, but will not include representatives from industry unless appointed by the State Veterinarian.
Membership of this group may consist of representatives of the following agencies:

- Washington Invasive Species Council (WISC)
- U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Wildlife Services (USDA-WS)
- Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA)
- Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW)
- U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
- Washington State University (WSU), Washington Animal Disease Diagnostics Laboratory

## Incident Management Teams

The unified command, consisting of state and federal agencies, may choose to activate an incident management team (IMT). Priorities for this team will be set forth by the MAC-G. This team will consist initially of WDFW, WISC, WSDA and local USDA-WS personnel. As the incident expands, additional personnel may be added along with additional positions to help manage the incident. If needed, a regional IMT or USDA IMT may be requested for support. See Appendix 3 for Ag Complexity Analysis Tool.

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# Chapter 2: Detection and Notification

## Detection Reporting

The Washington Invasive Species Council (WISC) is responsible for collecting reports of invasive species through:

- The *Squeal on Pigs!* hotline 1-888-268-9219
- Invasive Animals Reporting Form
- *WA Invasives* smartphone application (through Apple App Store or Google Play)
- Other forms of public/agency personnel reports

When a report of feral swine in Washington State is received, WISC will collect the following information from the reporting individual:

- Date and time of the report
- Date and time and location of the sighting(s)
- Name and contact information of the reporting party
- Number of animals seen
- Photos of swine and/or swine damage if possible

In the event that a coordinating authority receives a feral swine report in person, direct telephone call, or other reporting pathway, the recipient will notify WISC and develop a message outlining the correct detection reporting process. In the event that feral swine are verified as being present in a county adjacent to the international border, the WISC will notify the British Columbia Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Strategy.

## Notification of Appropriate Authorities

When a report of feral swine is received, it is the responsibility of WISC to notify primary coordinating agencies:

- US Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Wildlife Services (USDA-WS),
- Washington Department of Agriculture Animal Services Division (WSDA),
- Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW)
- Additional coordinating authorities as deemed appropriate (See Appendix 1 Coordinating Authorities).

## Verification of Species Presence

After receiving notification of the sighting, USDA-WS will lead in verifying the presence/absence of feral swine. With support from primary coordinating agencies, USDA-WS representatives will gather additional information on the swine sighting and may conduct a site visit to verify the presence of feral swine.

If there is sufficient evidence of swine presence, USDA-WS will notify WISC and contact additional coordinating authorities, the landowner, and county authorities (animal services or enforcement) to determine whether swine are feral or livestock.

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# Chapter 3: Response

If feral swine are detected in Washington State, USDA-WS will respond in a coordinated, mutually supported manner with local and federal government agencies. Response authorities will work with landowners to determine the population size, reproductive capability, range of animals, and options for eradiation. The extent of distribution will determine response levels. These levels include:

> **Local/limited response.** This level of response is managed by local, state, federal, and industry officials, with response coordination provided primarily at the state and regional levels and with national-level consultation and consequence management.
> **Regional response.** A regional response is managed by local, state, federal, and industry officials, with national-level crisis management, response coordination, consultation, and consequence management.
> **National response.** This level of response requires the combined efforts of local, state, industry, and federal officials, as well as non-agricultural personnel from government (e.g., FEMA) and the private sector in national-level crisis management, response coordination, consultation, and consequence management.

Response support for state agencies in a feral swine response may be implemented by the Washington State Emergency Management Division (EMD) through State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) activation when agency response capabilities are overwhelmed, have depleted or anticipate depleting their resources.

## Determination of Distribution

Survey data will be collected and mapped, which may illustrate the following features:

- Locations of reported sightings
- Estimated population of feral swine
- Locations of apparent damage from feral swine
- At-risk conservation or restoration sites and locations with rare, threatened, or endangered species
- At-risk agricultural and other economic resources

Appropriate information will be input into a local database managed by USDA-WS.

## Rapid Response Preparations

After a positive verification of swine is determined, USDA-WS, WISC, and coordinating authorities will implement measures to prevent the spread of feral swine. USDA-WS may convene a workgroup of applicable coordinating authorities to discuss resource needs and availability along with permitting requirements. Response preparations may occur concurrently with the verification of species presence and distribution determination sections of this plan.

## Rapid Response Action

Wildlife Services will develop and implement a rapid response focused on immediate eradication of the feral swine (methods may include, but not limited to, aerial operations, dogs, shooting, and trapping). Using their Decision Model, USDA-WS will develop a response plan which could include the following:

- A list of available resources
- Evaluation of appropriate eradication methods
- Commitment from partners and agencies on roles and responsibilities, depending on land ownership

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- A timeline for control and eradication actions
- A list of necessary permits for control measures (e.g., body-gripping traps)
- An outreach/education strategy
- Monitoring of result

## Preventing Further Spread

Eradication of localized feral swine populations must be aggressive, continuous, and simultaneous on public and private lands. The potential measures include, but are not limited to trapping, day and night shooting over bait, aerial operations in addition to education/outreach, barriers, and reduced access.

In the absence of aggressive and coordinated effort, feral swine will take refuge on untreated state, federal, or private lands and re-populate when eradication efforts cease. Feral swine control and eradication methods must be adaptive, as more is understood of the behavior and dynamics of feral swine populations as well as the efficiency of control efforts.

## Public Information

The workgroup of applicable coordinating authorities will select a Public Information Officer (PIO) for the incident, who will be responsible for coordinating all releases of information between the coordinating authorities and media. In the event the coordinating authorities wish to issue a press release regarding a response, PIO for the incident will be responsible for coordinating the development and release of all information from the coordinating authorities to the media and public.

A Joint Information Center (JIC) may be established to:

- Coordinate public announcements, including agency press releases, alerts, and governor's proclamations.
- Coordinate with unified command at the Incident Command Post.
- Provide communication directives to other state, local, and federal counterparts.

The JIC will be comprised of public information officers from MAC-G represented agencies, and will be established by the lead agencies within the MAC-G. The establishment of the JIC will be discussed in initial planning meeting with the MAC-G and IMT.

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# Chapter 4: Incident and Post-Incident Reporting

## Incident Reporting

Following a rapid response action, WISC will facilitate the preparation of an incident report for distribution to WISC and other coordinating authorities. The incident report may include, but not be limited to:

- Naming of the incident; e.g. "Angry Mountain" population
- Date of notification
- Landowner name
- Land manager (if different)
- Address
- Contact info: phone, email
- Legal Description of Property with swine damage
- Map of sighting location and coordinates (WGS84, decimal degrees)
- Date of contact and/or investigation
- Results of investigation (swine presence or likelihood of alternative species)
- History: Any past action(s) taken
- Incident closure date
- Recommended next steps

## Interagency Response Debriefing

Following rapid response activities, WISC and USDA-WS will facilitate an after action debriefing with designated coordinating authorities involved in the incident. The debriefing will ensure that coordinating authorities receive information on the incident and have the opportunity to discuss lessons learned in order to improve future response activities.

## Reporting Visibly Sick Swine

In the event that visibly sick swine are located, WISC and USDA-WS will notify the WSDA Animal Services Division.

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# Chapter 5: Depopulation and Disposal

## Depopulation

The spread of disease by feral swine poses a significant risk to the health of people, pets, wildlife, and livestock, including the domestic pork industry. Mass depopulation (also known as "culling") may be practiced during a major disease outbreak, to help prevent or mitigate the spread of the disease through the elimination of infected, exposed, or potentially exposed animals.

Qualified personnel must be proficient in the performance of depopulation procedures using the quickest, safest, and most humane methods practicable given the circumstances. These processes and practices will be applied to management of feral swine outside of a disease outbreak as well.

## Disposal

In case of a disease outbreak among feral swine populations, disposal measures will be implemented to prevent the introduction of, or mitigate the spread of the pathogen. Disposal methods include the elimination of infected, or potentially infected, animal carcasses and associated materials; and also serves to remove potentially contaminated feed or food products from the animal feed and human food supply. These methods will be uniformly applied, as possible, to disposal of feral swine, as a precautionary measure to prevent the introduction of, or mitigate the spread of a pathogen that may be present in the feral swine carcass.

The overall goal of disposal operations during an animal health incident is to eliminate all animal carcasses and related material in a timely, safe, bio-secure, aesthetically acceptable, and environmentally responsible manner.

Disposal has the following preparedness goals:

- Establish disposal protocols or procedures to meet regulatory requirements.
- Identify suitable locations where disposal activities may be conducted.
- Identify suitable disposal personnel, supplies, materials, and equipment prior to the incident or disease outbreak.
- Prevent the further spread of the disease agent, with little or no effect on the environment, considering community preferences, and conserving meat or animal protein if logistically supportable from a biosecurity viewpoint.

Disposal has the following response goal:

- Properly dispose of contaminated and potentially contaminated materials, including animal carcasses, as quickly as possible while maximizing pathogen containment, environmental sustainability, stakeholder acceptance, and cost effectiveness.

Qualified personnel must be proficient and knowledgeable in all aspects of potential disposal options. Decision makers must be comfortable choosing the quickest, safest, and most environmentally responsible disposal methods practicable given the circumstances. It is crucial that appropriate disposal decisions are made by these qualified personnel and that potential negative environmental and biosecurity risks associated with various disposal options are accounted for in the decision making and subsequent planning. Failure to properly account for important factors related to a disposal option can result in devastating environmental and biosecurity consequences.

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Definitions of disposal and approved disposal methods of dead animals in Washington are outlined in WAC 246-203-121. The provisions of RCW 16.36.092 and chapter WAC 16-25 supersede the provisions of this regulation for the disposal of a livestock animal that has died because of disease or unknown cause.

For specific information disposal, see the following resources:

- WSDA Animal Carcass Disposal Map link
- WSDA Carcass Disposal Guidelines

Animal disease reporting requirements are defined and outlined in WAC 16-70.

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# Appendix 1: Coordinating Authorities

| Core Coordinating Authorities | Contact Information | |
|---|---|---|
| **Washington Invasive Species Council (WISC)** | Justin Bush<br>Executive Coordinator<br>(360) 902-3088 (office)<br>(360) 704-0973 (cell)<br>Justin.Bush@rco.wa.gov | |
| **U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service, Wildlife Services (USDA-WS)** | Terry Smith<br>Assistant State Director, WA/AK<br>(360) 742-5498 (office)<br>(360) 545-2414 (cell)<br>Terry.L.Smith@usda.gov | Mike Linnell<br>State Director, WA/AK<br>(360) 742-5499 (office)<br>(360) 463-4857 (cell)<br>Mike.A.Linnell@usda.gov |
| **Washington State Department of Agriculture Animal Services Division (WSDA)** | Dr. Brian Joseph<br>State Veterinarian<br>(360) 902-1881 (office)<br>(360) 890 6943 (cell)<br>BJoseph@agr.wa.gov<br><br>Dr. Ric Torgerson<br>Region 2 Field Veterinarian<br>(360) 688-4294 (cell)<br>(360) 725-5655 (office)<br>rtorgerson@agr.wa.gov | John Price<br>Compliance Unit Program Manager<br>(360) 972-5790 (cell)<br>(360) 902-1946 (office)<br>jprice@agr.wa.gov |
| **Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW)** | Mick Cope<br>Deputy Assistant Director<br>(360) 902-2362<br>Mick.Cope@dfw.wa.gov<br><br>Captain Eric Anderson<br>Invasive Species Lead<br>(360) 640-0493<br>Eric.Anderson@dfw.wa.gov | Dr. Kristen Mansfield<br>State Wildlife Veterinarian<br>(509) 998-2023<br>Kristin.Mansfield@dfw.wa.gov<br><br>Captain Phil Johnson<br>State Agency Liaison<br>(360) 586-2003<br>Philip.johnson@dfw.wa.gov |

| Situational Coordinating Authorities | Contact Information | |
|---|---|---|
| **Washington Department of Natural Resources (WDNR)** | Carrie Nelson<br>Special Use Leasing Manager<br>(360) 902-1437<br>Carrie.Nelson@dnr.wa.gov | |
| **Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission (Parks)** | Lisa Lantz<br>Stewardship Manager<br>(360) 902-8641<br>Lisa.Lantz@parks.wa.gov | |
| **USDA APHIS Veterinary Services – Region 6** | Dr. Leonard Eldridge<br>AVIC AK, OR, WA<br>(360) 753-9585<br>Leonard.E.Eldridge@aphis.usda.gov | |
| **U.S. Forest Service Pacific Northwest Region (USFS) – Region 6** | Josh Chapman<br>Wildlife Program Leader<br>(503) 808-2901<br>joshuachapman@fs.fed.us | |
| **National Parks Service (NPS)** | John (Jay) Goldsmith<br>Pacific West Chief of Natural Resources<br>(415) 623-2206<br>Jay_Goldsmith@nps.gov | |
| **US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)** | Bridgette Flanders, Chief<br>Branch of Refuge Biology and Inventory & Monitoring<br>(503) 231-2232<br>bridgette_flanders@fws.gov | |
| **Washington Division of Emergency Management (EMD)** | Chris D. Utzinger<br>Response Section Manager<br>(253) 512-7033<br>Chris.Utzinger@mil.wa.gov | |
| **Washington Department of Transportation (WDOT)** | John Himmel<br>State Agency Liaison<br>(360) 705-7973<br>himmelj@wsdot.wa.gov | |
| **Washington Department of Health (WDOH)** | Erika Henry<br>State Agency Liaison<br>(360) 701-7532<br>Erika.Henry@doh.wa.gov | |
| **Washington State Patrol (WSP)** | Tyler Ray<br>State Agency Liaison<br>(360) 704-2968<br>Tyler.Ray@wsp.wa.gov | |
| **Washington State University (WSU)** | Todd Murray<br>ANR Unit Director<br>(509) 335-8744<br>tmurray@wsu.edu | |
| **Washington Department of Ecology** | William Hannah<br>State Agency Liaison<br>(360) 407-6038<br>whan461@ecy.wa.gov | |
| **British Columbia Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Strategy** | Martina Beck, Head<br>Invasive Fauna Unit<br>(250) 208-6520<br>Martina.Beck@gov.bc.ca | Emily Lomas<br>Terrestrial Invasive Fauna Specialist<br>(778) 362-7165<br>Emily.Lomas@gov.bc.ca |

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# Appendix 2: Additional Resources

## Washington Invasive Species Council Information

Invasive Species Sighting Reports
https://invasivespecies.wa.gov/report-a-sighting/

Squeal on Pigs! Campaign
https://invasivespecies.wa.gov/campaigns/squeal-on-pigs/

Feral Swine Factsheet
https://invasivespecies.wa.gov/priorityspecies/feral-swine/

Feral Swine Detection and Reporting Poster
https://invasivespecies.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/InvsvAnimalPoster.pdf

## Washington State Department of Agriculture

Definitions
http://app.leg.wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=16-54-010

Prohibited Entries
http://app.leg.wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=16-54-065

Swine Importation and Testing Requirements
http://app.leg.wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=16-54-111

Swine Diseases Regulated in Washington State
http://app.leg.wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=16-80

Feral Swine
http://app.leg.wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=16-80-060

## Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife

Deleterious Exotic Wildlife
https://apps.leg.wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=220-640-200

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## Appendix 3: Ag Complexity Analysis Tool

| Complexity Analysis Tool - Ag | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Incident Name | | | | Type of Incident | | | |
| Date | | | Time | | VAxWF=TP | | |
| **Ranking Element** | **Value of 0** | **Value of 1** | **Value of 3** | **Value of 5** | **Value Assigned** | **Weight Factor** | **Total Points** |
| First Responder Safety (State & Ag incident responders) | N/A | Low exposure with simple hazards easily mitigated through understanding of livestock handling. No zoonotic agent. | Moderate exposure to hazardous animal handling & presence of zoonotic agents - responders easily protected against infection. | High exposure to zoonotic disease and dangerous activities to mitigate disease. | | **5** | |
| Personnel resources for field and incident management | N/A | Disease outbreak managed by regular in-state USDA and State animal health officials. | Require more animal health (SME) incident responders than available in State - Require other State or USDA district-wide personnel. | Extreme need for national deployment of Animal Health (SME) incident responders in field and for incident management. | | **5** | |
| Overtime of responders and/or cumulative fatigue of response | N/A | Some extra work needed by responders and managers of incident. | The response is overwhelming the existing responders and jurisdictional authorities normal business processes. | Completely exhausted, fatigue of entire response personnel - cannot keep up with demands of incident or normal business. | | **5** | |
| Incident Action Plans, ICS forms, Resource Tracking, SitReports, Epi & Mapping | N/A | Very limited need for documentation & ICS forms - State & USDA VS can handle via normal office staff. | Moderate amount of forms needed, documentation needed for HERDS, EMRS, WebEOC, Epi. Additional staffing is required. | Large amount of documentation, resource tracking, and epidemiology & mapping. Significant additional staffing is needed. | | **3** | |
| Current Organization Performance | N/A | Current organization performing within expectations and span of control, can develop and implement the IAP. | Current management team staffing is challenged to keep pace with developing and implementing IAP, overhead staff is extended and pushing limits of span of control. | Mgt. team is too understaffed to develop and implement IAP, overhead staff is extended, exceeds span of control. Incident requires multiple, branches, groups, divisions, and/or specialized operations. | | **3** | |

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| Ranking Element | Value of 0 | Value of 1 | Value of 3 | Value of 5 | Value Assigned | Weight Factor | Total Points |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Public Awareness through Public Information | N/A | Mitigating outbreak can be easily done via public media messaging. | Messaging must be reinforced continuously and moderate amount work to inform via various means. Some closures of events. | Public awareness on incident is difficult and incident has negative implications on economy. Many closures of events and quarantines. | | **5** | |
| Media interest / Public Interest | N/A | No controversy or media interest. | Media releases are issued, and media frequently contacting PIO. Conflict & controversy present. Animal rights issues raised. | Media present or contacting PIO during operations periods. National media present or JIC activated. Animal rights issues heavily involved. | | **3** | |
| Multiple jurisdictions directly impacted | N/A | Incident is contained within one or two counties with minimal consequence management. | Three - five counties are directly impacted by incident with moderate consequence management needed. | State-wide Ag communities affected with large amount of consequence management for entire communities. The introduction of disease was intentional (Agroterrorism). | | **3** | |
| Ag Critical Infrastructure (ACI) to be protected (livestock and product trade with states & countries; genetic lines of livestock, consumer confidence in Ag products) | N/A | No Food & Ag Critical Infrastructure (ACI) affected within or outside of disease incident. | ACI is affected moderately with livestock movement restrictions to other states and countries. Some Ag product affected. Minimal international trade implications. | Numerous CI within or adjacent to the incident. Severe damage is likely without physical protective being taken. Extensive international trade implications. | | **4** | |
| Objectives | N/A | Objectives are easily achieved. | Objectives are moderately difficult to achieve. | Objectives are difficult to achieve or are eclipsed by new objectives each day. Conflicts between objectives and constraints exist. | | **5** | |

| Ranking Element | Value of 0 | Value of 1 | Value of 3 | Value of 5 | Value Assigned | Weight Factor | Total Points |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anticipated incidence and prevalence of the disease outbreak | N/A | Low level of spread, new premises would occur slowly with low morbidity & mortality-1 species affected. There are few premises (1-4) in close proximity (10 km with susceptible species. | Moderate degree of spread with new premises popping up quickly. Affects multiple species between animals and indirect contact. There are several premises (5-9) in close proximity (10 km radius) with susceptible species. | Rapid spread. Multiple species affected. Spread through animals and indirect contact. There are many premises (>10) in close proximity (10 km radius) with susceptible species. | | **5** | |
| Animal demographics | | Low to medium density of production animal populations in affected areas | Medium to high density of production animal populations in affected areas. Low to medium risk of disease spread to production populations. Few industry premises impacted by quarantine and other disease response strategies. | High density of production populations in affected areas. High risk of disease spread to production populations. Many industry premises impacted by quarantine and other disease response activities. | | **5** | |
| Species / populations impacted | | Disease outbreak impacts one species or production setting. | Disease outbreak impacts one species in multiple production settings. | Disease outbreak impacts multiple species and/ or multiple production settings | | **5** | |
| Disease introduction | | Single disease introduction, appears to be naturally caused. | Few disease introductions detected, appear to be naturally caused. | Multiple disease introductions detected, source unknown, intentional introduction suspected. | | **5** | |
| Disease ecology and etiology | | Disease is spread through direct contact. The disease ecology indicates slow moving. Little to no disease spread detected. | Indications that wildlife and/or other vectors are mildly involved with disease spread. Disease spread potential increased with direct and indirect contact. | Disease is aerosolized, rapidly spreading, and persists in the environment. Wildlife or other vectors play a larger role in spread. Introduction. | | **5** | |

| Ranking Element | Value of 0 | Value of 1 | Value of 3 | Value of 5 | Value Assigned | Weight Factor | Total Points |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anticipated duration of resource commitment | N/A | 1-3 Days on scene or long term but low involvement of responders / State. | State needs moderate involvement and other duties take backseat. Could be long term outbreak but sporadic heavy involvement. | Greater than 7 day outbreak with heavy involvement of State. | | **5** | |
| Incident / disease control & eradication measures | N/A | No disease control measures outside of affected premises. No effect anticipated to Ag or general economy. | Disease control measures needed within and outside of affected premises. Some effect on overall livestock sector(s) involved. | Extensive control measures within the State and in control areas. Other states affected. Severe and imminent disease spread is likely without specialized resources. | | **4** | |
| Quarantines needed to control disease | N/A | Occurring only on initial premises but planning taking place for additional premises. | Quarantines on a moderate scale. | Numerous quarantines to manage movements on & off farms/operations. | | **4** | |
| Livestock movement controls and permitting | N/A | Not occurring other than on the 1-2 premises affected. | Livestock movement restrictions in control area and part of state. Movements permitted and special routing may be needed. | Large scale livestock movement restrictions & permitting to use biosecure corridors. | | **4** | |
| Biosecurity procedures on infected, contact, and susceptible premises | N/A | Minimal needed and minimal premises in need. | Moderate amount of biosecurity needed and a moderate amount of premises in need. | High number of premises will be needing biosecurity and state-wide ramped up biosecurity is needed. | | **4** | |
| Surveillance for disease & diagnostic lab capacity | N/A | Small number of animals to be sampled and tested. State laboratory capacity not a problem. | Moderate number of animals to be tested by specialized personnel and a drain on laboratory capacity in the State - hard to keep up. | Overwhelming need for high number of animals to be sampled and tested. State lab capacity is overwhelmed. | | **3** | |

| Ranking Element | Value of 0 | Value of 1 | Value of 3 | Value of 5 | Value Assigned | Weight Factor | Total Points |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Depopulation of affected animals and / or premises | N/A | Only small number of affected animals need to be euthanized and necropsy (autopsy) performed. | Moderate number of animals to be depopulated/euthanized or a moderate number of premises affected. Some non-affected animals also need to be euthanized. Special depop procedures needed. | Large number of animals to be depopulated and / or large number of premises to be depopulated. Specialized depopulation procedures needed. | | **3** | |
| Carcass disposal operations for animals that died or had to be depopulated/ euthanized | N/A | Dead animals can be disposed of using normal operations at the premises. | Special carcass disposal will be needed for a moderate amount of animals. Need multiple options for disposal -- burial, landfill, composting, rendering, incineration. Local, State, and public health involved. | Large animals need special disposal options. Need multiple options for large number of carcasses / biomass. Involvement of local agencies, State, and public health. | | **3** | |
| Virus Elimination and Cleaning and Disinfection (C&D)Operations | N/A | Contained to 1-2 premises and virus elimination and C&D is being done by premises owners / managers of the operation. | Moderate number of premises are affected and quarantined with multiple control areas. All premises within the 6 mile control area needed stepped up virus elimination and C&D (biosecurity). | Large number of premises affected and quarantined with many control areas. All premises within the numerous control areas need virus elimination and C&D resources. | | **3** | |
| **POINT RANGES** | 0-20% | **0 to 79** | Consider normal operations (Type 5) | **TOTAL POINTS** | | | |
| | 21-40% | **80 to 158** | Consider changing to a Type 4 incident | | | | |
| | 41-60% | **160 to 237** | Consider changing to a Type 3 incident | | | | |
| | 61-80% | **238 to 316** | Consider changing to a Type 2 incident | | | | |
| | 81-100% | **317 to 395** | Consider changing to a Type 1 incident | | | | |
| Prepared by: | | | Signature: | | Date / Time: | | |
| Position: | | | **INCIDENT PRIORITIZATION RANKING** | | | | |

FINAL DRAFT

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